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1960] NOTES 649
Indigents' Right to Counsel on Appeal
Nothing rankles more in the human heart than the feeling of injustice.'
Fallibility is a trait inherent in every human institution, including
the American judicial system. Although Perfect Justice may always
remain a philosopher's fantasy, a nation dedicated to the preservation
of human freedom and dignity must constantly strive to reduce the
margin of judicial error. Toward that end, federal and state consti-
tutions have erected elaborate procedural safeguards to protect the
defendant in a criminal trial. Recognizing, however, that no safe-
guard capable of preventing all human error has yet been designed,
and that innocent people may still be convicted by the most cautious
trial courts, 2 American legislatures have provided extensive correc-
tive appellate procedures.'
Appellate review of criminal cases is a development of relatively
recent origin,4 as is that procedural right so essential to the exercise
of an effective appeal - the right to be represented by counsel. " It
is the purpose of this note to consider the interdependence of these
two developments - the necessity of providing counsel in order to
assure the accused an adequate and effective appellate review.
If the accused is financially able to secure his own counsel, his
right to be represented on appeal is not questioned.' The issue, then,
is whether an indigent must be provided with counsel by the govern-
ment to prosecute an appeal from conviction. To determine whether
representation by counsel is essential to effective appellate review, it
is necessary to consider the nature of the right to counsel and the con-
stitutional character of the right to appeal.
1. R.H. SMrm,JusTicEANDTHEPOOR 10 (1919).
2. For a collection of cases in which innocent men were convicted, and their innocence un-
covered merely by the most formitous drcumstances, see BORCHARD, CoNvCTING THE IN-
NocENT (1932).
3. An account of the history and organization of state appellate courts may be found in
ORFIELD, CRIMNAL APPEALS IN AmERICA 215-31 (1939).
4. Although appeals have long been familiar to the law, appellate review, as it is practiced
today, is a recent development. Procedures for appellate review of criminal cases in federal
courts were established by the Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354, and the Act of
March 3, 1891, ch. 517, §5 5, 6, 26 Star. 827. See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310,
319-22 (1892); see generally O'Halloran, Development of the Right of Appeal in Criminal
Cases, 27 CAN. B. REV. 153 (1949), in which the author indicates that an adequate system
of appellate review did not exist in England before 1907.
5. BEANEY, THE RiGHT TO COUNSEL IN Am C A" COuRTS (1955). The right of an indi-
gent to have court-appointed counsel is of even more recent origin. Rackow, The Right to
Counsel: English and American Precedents, 11 THE WILLIAM & MARY Q. 3 (1954).
6. Regardless of whether the accused is entitled to have court-appointed counsel, his right to
be heard through his own counsel is "unqualified." Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9 (1954).
The right to be represented by self-retained counsel is more vigorously protected than is the
right of an indigent to the appointment of counsel. See Ex parte Lee, 123 F. Supp. 439, 445
(D. R.I. 1954), aff'd, 217 F.2d 647 (1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 975 (1954),
where the court held: "Petitioner erroneously regards as synonymous the right to be represented
by counsel of one's choice and the privilege of enjoying assistance provided by the State....'
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THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL - TRIAL LEVEL
To secure impartial laws and an equal administration of justice, and
thereby to make possible the enjoyment of the rights and opportunities
contemplated by a democracy, the State itself exists.7
Essential to any protection the accused may have in a criminal
proceeding is the right to be represented by counsel; for without the
assistance of counsel, his ability to assert any other rights he may
possess is virtually non-existent." The sixth amendment guarantees
that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
.. . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."9  There are
similar guarantees in the constitutions and statutes of every state.'"
In keeping with its insistence that "all people must stand on an
equality before the bar of justice in every American court,"" the
United States Supreme Court has held that the sixth amendment em-
braces the right to have court-appointed counsel if the accused is fi-
nancially unable to secure his own attorney, as well as the right to be
represented by self-retained counsel.'2 Ignorance of the technicalities
of the law is not a trait peculiar to the wealthy; to force the indigent
to stand trial without legal assistance would be to exact an extremely
heavy penalty for the "crime" of poverty.
The Court in Powell v. zllabama3 held that failure in a state
prosecution to afford the accused the opportunity to secure counsel
is a denial of due process. This gave rise to the hope that the right
to counsel would receive the same vigorous protection in state courts
under the fourteenth amendment that it had received in federal courtsunder the sixth amendment. That hope has never been realized. In
Betts v. Brady,'4 the Court announced its now famous "fundamental
fairness" doctrine:
As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction
and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and
7. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3.
8. "Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether
the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
10. BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 237. A table of the provisions for the assignment of
counsel for indigent defendants in criminal cases is to be found in THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER AssOcIATION, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, Appendix (1959).
11. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
12. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
13. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel in a
particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental
fairness, we cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexorable com-
mand that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly con-
ducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by
counse' 15
Thus, even at the trial level, a state need not always provide the ac-
cused with counsel or give the accused an opportunity to secure coun-
sel. The age, intelligence, education, and experience of the accused;
the nature of the offense and the harshness of the sentence which may
be imposed; the circumstances in which the trial is conducted: all of
these are factors to be considered in determining whether a trial with-
out counsel is consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness. Al-
though a seventeen-year-old illiterate Negro is not afforded due proc-
ess if tried without counsel,' 6 a thirty-one-year-old college graduate
can assert no such complaint.17  A man who has had several encoun-
ters with the courts may be deemed competent to defend himself with-
out legal assistance, at least to the extent that trial without counsel is
not violative of due process.'" Although the law shows no less solici-
tude for liberty than for life,' the accused in a non-capital case has
been denied due process only if he can show "special circumstances"
indicating that he could not have an adequate defense without a law-
yer assisting him. 0
These decisions can only be supported by one or more of the fol-
lowing premises: (1) That the assistance of a trained and competent
attorney is of little importance to the defendant in a criminal case.
(2) That legal training is not necessary to enable one to conduct an
adequate defense.2 (3) That the standard of justice essential to due
process is abysmally low.
15. Id. at 473. "That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness,
shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of such denial." Id. at 462.
16. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957). See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437
(1948) (conviction of seventeen-year-old on plea of guilty reversed for want of counsel);
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948) (reversal of conviction of an eighteen-year-old who had
requested and was refused counsel in a non-capital case); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S.
663 (1947) (one day trial of a seventeen-year-old who had pleaded guilty to a murder charge,
and who had not been advised of his right to counsel, was held to be violative of due process).
17. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
18. See, e.g., Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950). But see Gibbs v. Burke, 337
U.S. 733 (1949), where trial without counsel was held violative of due process although the
accused had several previous convictions. The trial lacked "fundamental fairness because
neither counsel nor adequate judicial guidance or protection was furnished at the trial." Id. at
781.
19. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 681, (1948).
20. Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134, 135 (1951).
21. For a general discussion of the fair trial doctrine see Rackow, The Right to Counsel
Time for Recognition Under the Due Process Clause, 10 WEST. REs. L. REv. 216 (1959).
For discussion of the right to counsel in state and federal courts see BEANEY, op. cit. supra
note 5.
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Traditionally, the right to be represented by counsel in state crimi-
nal proceedings has been considered as a matter of due process."
Consequently, courts have directed their efforts toward establishing
minimum standards of fairness.23 But there is strong support for the
argument that the right to appellate counsel must be measured by the
more express standards of the equal protection clause, rather than
in terms of due process. The argument, in essence, is this: Denial of
the right to adequate appellate review is a denial of equal protection.
If the appellant is without counsel on appeal, he is denied his right to
adequate appellate review. Therefore, if the appellant is without
counsel on appeal, he is denied equal protection. The major premise
of this syllogism is established by Griffin v. Illinois.2 4
GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS - THE RIGHT To
ADEQUATE APPELLATE REVIEW
Few legal scholars are unfamiliar with the principle that the right
to appeal is not essential to due process of law. 5 The rule has been
frequently applied,2 and is readily available to aid the courts in dis-
posing of some rather perplexing problems.2 Those who cling to
that which is familiar and certain in the law may abhor the forces
which have caused the gradual narrowing of that principle, and which
may ultimately render it valueless; however, it cannot be denied that
such forces exist.
That the right to appeal is not essential to due process was au-
thoritatively established in 1894 by the decision in McKane v. Durs-
ton.2 The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of a New York statute which made appeals contingent upon a find-
ing by the trial judge that there was reasonable doubt that the trial
court's judgment would stand.
An appeal to a higher court from a judgment of conviction is not a
matter of absolute right, independently of constitutional or statutory
provisions allowing it, and a State may accord it to a person convicted
of crime upon such terms as it thinks proper.2 9 (Emphasis added.)
22. Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955);
Osborne v. Johnston, 120 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1941) (habeas corpus from state conviction);
People v. Logan, 137 Cal. App.2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1935). See generally Roberts, Right of
an Accused to Have Counsel Appointed by the Court, 45 MIcH. L REv. 1047 (1947).
23. See Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality, 12 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
182 (1955).
24. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
25. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
26. E.g., United States v. Heinze, 218 U.S. 532 (1910); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505
(1903); De Maurez v. Swope, 104 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1939); McCue v. Commonwealth, 103
Va. 870, 49 S.E. 623 (1905); State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14 (1927).
27. E.g., National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (ap-
peal denied in order to protect the collectibility of a money judgment).
28. 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
29. Ibid.
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Concurrence with the McKane decision has been widespread,30 but as
appellate procedures became more extensive the rule has developed
several limitations.
Although a state is not compelled to afford appellate review, once
having done so, the appellate procedures it provides must comply with
the requirements of due process.3 1 If a state does provide for ap-
peal, it must not create arbitrary classifications in determining who
is entitled to exercise the right to appeal, for to do so would be a vio-
lation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.32
Furthermore, although a state need not afford appellate review in
criminal cases, it must provide the accused at least one opportunity
to obtain review of constitutional issues. 8
In Griffin v. Illinois," the reasoning developed by the courts in
the instances mentioned above was brought to its logical culmination.
Illinois law provided that: "Writs of error in all criminal cases are
writs of right and shall be issued of course."3 5 The petitioners, con-
victed of armed robbery, requested as "poor persons" that a steno-
graphic transcript of the record be furnished them without cost.
Their request was denied and the appeal dismissed. The Court, in a
4-1-4 decision, held that the failure to provide a transcript was a
denial of equal protection and of due process under the fourteenth
amendment.3 " With these words, the Court placed the right to "an
adequate appellate review" on virtually the same level as the right to
a fair trial:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effec-
tively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who
have money enough to pay the costs in advance.37
It is not within the scope of this note to examine the many implica-
tions of the Griffin case, 8 but only to consider the effect which that
30. Cases cited note 26 supra.
31. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
32. Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942) (sup-
pression of appellate documents prepared by prisoners, until time for appeal had expired, held
to be denial of equal protection).
33. Young v. Ragan, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).
34. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 5 769.1 (1955).
36. The Court speaks in terms of both due process and equal protection, although it would
seem that the issue was one solely of equal protection. See Schaefer, Federalism and State
Crimind Procedure, 70 HARV. L REV. 1 (1956).
37. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1949).
38. For an excellent analysis of the significance of the Griffin case see Willcox & Bloustein,
The Griffin Case - Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORN. L.Q. 1 (1957). The
authors' statement of the issue they consider indicates the condusion they reach: "Is it a de-
privation of an individual's fundamental constitutional rights to so administer justice as to
,condition the assertion of basic legal rights on the ability to pay?" Id. at 3-4. Also see com-
ments on the Griffin case in 55 MICi-. L. REV. 413 (1957), 17 OMO ST. LJ. 553 (1956),
70 HARV. L. REV. 126 (1956); see Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d '1072 (1957).
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case and others have had upon the right to be represented by counsel
on appeal. That the holding in the Griffin case is not limited to situ-
ations wherein appeal is granted as a matter of right, rather than as
a matter of discretion, has already been decided."' Since every state
has some form of appeal in criminal cases,"0 the question is not
whether it must provide for appeal, but, having done so, how must
its appellate procedure be administered. More specifically, can there
be an "adequate appellate review" if the accused is not represented
by counsel to prosecute his appeal?
The concept of equal protection implicit in the Griffin decision
does not merely prohibit a state from affirmatively imposing a dis-
criminatory denial of the right to appeal to one class, while granting
that right to members of another class; the decision imposes upon a
state the duty of removing barriers arising from conditions which the
state did not create, in order that rich and poor may both enjoy the
same opportunity to exercise an effective appeal.4 ' If the necessity
of counsel to effective appellate review can be demonstrated, it may
be possible to apply the broader tests of equal protection, rather than
the more limited tests of due process, to determine whether the ac-
cused has been afforded his constitutional right to counsel. Rather
than striving toward minimum standards of justice, courts would be
forced to determine whether the indigent had received treatment com-
parable to that granted the wealthy.42 The "fundamental fairness"
test would be an inappropriate measure of the right to appellate coun-
sel. Any failure to provide an indigent with counsel for appeal, in
circumstances where a rich man could appeal, would be a denial of
equal protection. 3
39. Ohio v. Burns, 360 U.S. 252 (1959). To examine the effect of the Burns decision on
state law, see OHIo REV. CODE § 2953.03 (1959).
40. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 3.
41. Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equality, 12 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 182
(1955).
42. Cf. Willcox & Bloustein, The Griffin Case - Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment,
43 CORN. L.Q. 1 (1957).
43. It has been suggested that the Griffin decision be applied to the right to trial counsel:
"The analogy to the right to counsel is close indeed: if a state allows one who can afford to re-
tain a lawyer to be represented by counsel, and so to obtain a different kind of trial, it must
furnish the same opportunity to those who are unable to hire a lawyer. Since indigence is
constitutionally an irrelevance, it would seem that a successful argument might be based upon
the proposition that the defendant by reason of his poverty is deprived of a right available to
those who can afford to exercise it." Schaefer, supra note 36, at 10. However, in view of
the fact that courts have distinguished between the right to be heard by self-retained counsel
and the right to the appointment of counsel, and that the United States Supreme Court has
frequently held that the right to a fair trial is not always violated merely because the accused
is without counsel, the poor are deprived of no recognized right if counsel is not appointed,
unless they are denied due process. The right to effective appellate review, on the other hand,
may require that counsel be appointed for appeal.
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COUNSEL ON APPEAL
In Federal Courts
The history of appellate review in criminal cases indicates that
courts are becoming increasingly reluctant to permit an indigent to
suffer discrimination because of his inability to pay the costs of the
appellate procedure available to those who can afford it." The
United States Supreme Court has often taken the position that when
the right of appeal is afforded by a state, it becomes but an additional
step in one proceeding to determine finally the guilt or innocence of
the accused. 5  Thus, in Johnson v. United States,46 in a per curiam
decision, the Court held that an indigent convicted in a federal court
was entitled to have court-appointed counsel to appeal from the trial
court's denial of leave to appeal in forma pauperis.47 The Court re-
ferred to the holding in Johnson v. Zerbst,4s that the accused is en-
titled to be represented by counsel "at every stage in a criminal pro-
ceeding," and concluded that appeal is merely another step in the pro-
ceeding. Because the petitioner was appealing from a refusal to ap-
point counsel and furnish a transcript for appeal, the result of the
decision is that counsel must be appointed in order to help the courts
determine whether counsel should be appointed. 9 Notable in this
decision is the Court's complete failure to consider the issues relating
to the right to be represented by counsel on appeal. That its holding
is inconclusive is manifested by the refusal of several lower federal
courts to follow the Johnson decision.50
The post-conviction right to counsel in federal courts, considered
by the Court in Johnson v. United States, generally arises under Sec-
tion 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code, which provides for
appeals in forma pauperis:
Any courts of the United States, may authorize commencement, prose-
cution or defense of any... action ... or appeal therein without pre-
payment of fees and costs ....
a) An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court
certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.
d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person
44. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45. Cases cited note 32 supra.
46. 352 U.S. 565 (1957), reversing United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1956).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides for appeals in forma pauperis.
48. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See also FED. R. CPM. P. 44.
49. It is also necessary that the indigent be provided with a transcript in order that he might
substantiate his allegation that a transcript be provided for appeal. Farley v. United States,
354 U.S. 521 (1957).
50. E.g., Gilpin v. United States, 265 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1959); Anderson v. Heinze, 258
F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1958); Gershon v. United States, 243 F.2d 527 (8th Cit. 1957); Brown
v. Johnston, 126 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1942); Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (9th Cir.
1939).
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unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of
poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous and mali-
cious.51
The meaning of "good faith" and the effect of the trial court's cer-
tification have been the source of considerable controversy in federal
courts. Although it has been held that good faith requires a showing
that the appeal has merit, 52 the more recent and better view is that
"the applicant's good faith is established by the presentation of any
issue that is not plainly frivolous. '53  Another court has suggested
that an appeal in forma pauperis should be allowed "whenever jus-
tice is at stake."5  Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that
the applicant establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he
would succeed on appeal, in order that he be granted the right to ap-
peal." Such a procedure would impose a double burden on the in-
digent: first, to prove to the trial court that a prejudicial defect ex-
isted; second, to convince an appellate court on the identical issue.
This system would succeed only in creating delay and unnecessary
expense.
Unless the trial court's certification of lack of good faith is to
constitute a complete substitute for the right to appellate review, the
applicant must be given some opportunity to demonstrate that the
certification was unwarranted. The certification must be given effect
unless the applicant is able to show that it was not issued in good
faith, or that his appeal is not frivolous.5" Recent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court attest to the principle that the accused
is denied the right to appeal and, therefore, is denied equal protec-
tion, if he is not furnished a transcript of the trial record or some
other appropriate means of substantiating his allegations of error on
appeal from denial of leave to appeal in forma pauperis.57 Johnson
v. United States5s extended that doctrine to embrace the right to be
provided with counsel to appeal an adverse certification of the trial
court. But lower federal courts have interpreted the Johnson deci-
sion to apply only to post-conviction procedures which are actual
stages of the criminal proceeding and are, thus, within the scope of
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 954, as amended).
52. Cf. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958).
53. Ibid.
54. Cash v. United States, 261 F.2d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
55. This requirement has been imposed by some state courts. See, e.g., Spaulding v. State,
137 Tex. Crim. 329, 127 S.W.2d 457 (1939).
56. Wells v. United States, 318 U.S. 257 (1943); O'Rourke v. United States, 248 F.2d 812
(1st Cir. 1957).
57. E.g., Farley v. United States, 354 U.S. 521 (1957); see also Eskridge v. Washington
State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
58. 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
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the sixth amendment.59  In habeas corpus proceedings and hearings
on motions to vacate judgment, controlled by the rules of civil proce-
dure,60 courts have applied the tests of due process and have frequent-
ly concluded that counsel need not be provided in those proceedings."-
Furthermore, although appeal is recognized as a -stage of the pro-
ceeding, courts have refused to require counsel when the defendant's
attack on the trial court's certification is obviously without merit on
its face.62
In State Courts
The right to appellate counsel in state courts is controlled by
statute. 3  Few states grant appellate counsel as a matter of right in
both capital and non-capital cases ;64 generally, the discretion of the
trial court is controlling. There is no uniform method of determin-
ing whether an appeal should be granted, and, if a case is appealed,
whether counsel should be provided. These questions may be deter-
mined by the trial court,"5 by a special committee of the local bar as-
sociation," by the Public Defender in jurisdictions where such office
exists,6 or by the attorney who was appointed to, try the case. Com-
petent advice at this stage may save the indigent from prosecuting a
59. An appeal, for example, under modem practice is a continuation of the trial proceeding.
See Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U.L REV. 1, 4 (1950). Because a motion
for leave to appeal is not part of the proceeding, counsel need not be appointed to make that
motion; but if leave to appeal is granted, counsel must be appointed to prosecute the appeal.
Reid v. Sanford, 42 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Ga. 1941). This distinction makes an important
right rest upon a mere technicality.
60. United States v. ILayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 (1952).
61. E.g., Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958); In the Matter of Dinerstein,
258 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1958); Gershon v. United States, 243 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1957);
Hill v. Settle, 244 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1957); Brown v. Johnston, 126 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1942); Garrison v. Johnston, 104 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1939).
62. E.g., Gilpin v. United States, 265 R-2d 203 (6th Cir. 1959) (appeal held to be frivolous
in three prior hearings); United States ex rel. Rodrigues v. Jackson, 246 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.
1957).
63. See People v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42 (Cal. App. 1958); State v. Delaney, 332 P.2d 71 (Ore.
1958) (decision has been overruled by statute; see Oregon laws 1959, ch. 636, § 23); Com-
monwealth v. Kumitis, 190 Pa. Super. 133, 151 A.2d 653 (1959).
64. See Wilkes, Constitutional Rights Of Convicted Indigents In State Criminal Proceedings,
33 TEMP. L.Q. 125, 147 (1959).
65. New York has held that assignment of counsel for appeal must be left to the discretion
of the trial court. People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 149 N.E.2d 85 (1958).
66. See People v. Logan, 137 Cal. App.2d 331, 290 P.2d 11 (1955), for a description of the
procedure involved when the appellate court refers the record to a special committee of the bar
association to determine whether there is merit for appeal. Some appellate courts conduct an
independent examination of the record to determine whether counsel should be appointed. See
People v. Hyde, 331 P.2d 42 (Cal. App. 1958).
67. See Jackson v. Reeves, 238 Ind. 708, 153 N.B.2d 604 (1958) "Obviously the public
defender could not and should not be required to appeal all cases -in which inmates of our
penal institutions consider that error was committed in their respective cases. Therefore, of
necessity he must be granted wide discretion as to whether the matters complained of present
any appealable issue." Id. at 709, 153 N.E.2d at 605.
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futile appeal which will serve only to increase the period he spends
in jail.68
It has been held that because appeal is not essential to due proc-
ess, appellate counsel need not be provided in state courts.6 9  But
some courts have rejected that contention, with the principles of equal
protection implicit in their reasoning:
If appeals are not desired in this state as a matter of right, recourse
should be had to the legislature and not to the courts to change the law
in this respect. It necessarily follows from the statutory provisions for
appeal, as of right, to an accused in a criminal case, that an indigent
defendant's right to be represented by counsel at public expense extends
to his prosecution of an appeal.70
However, the post-conviction right to counsel in state courts is gen-
erally considered in relation to the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment,7' just as the same right in federal courts is gen-
erally considered in terms of the due process requirements of the fifth
amendment.72  Consequently, unlike the right to trial counsel guaran-
teed by the sixth amendment in federal courts, the right to appellate
counsel is essentially the same in federal and state courts. The John-
son decision, 3 decided under the sixth amendment, promises more ex-
tensive enforcement of the right to appellate counsel in federal
courts; but arguments expressed in terms of due process show little
promise of strengthening that right in state courts. The necessary
"objective standards" of due process - "the laws and practices of
the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments"7 4
- have yet to be manifested in widespread enforcement of the right
to appellate counsel. The necessity of appellate counsel to due proc-
ess has been eloquently expressed:
The mere naked right to a review for error and to have counsel is not
sufficient. The right must be made available for the purposes for which
it is granted. The right to a review is but a hollow grant to one who
68. In some states sentence is suspended while an appeal is pending; consequently, the ac-
cused may find that he has served years for which he will receive no credit because an appeal
was noted. See, e.g., Reid v. Sanford, 42 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Ga. 1941) (appellant's bill of
exceptions lost by the court and appellant served over two years without receiving credit be-
cause an appeal had been noted).
69. See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 235 Minn. 221, 50 N.W.2d 270 (1958); McCue v. Common-
wealth, 103 Va. 870, 47 S.E. 623 (1905). This reasoning has also been employed in federal
courts. See Gargano v. United States, 137 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1943); Moore v. Aderhold, 108
F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1939) (failure of defendant's attorney to perfect appeal is not ground
for discharge on habeas corpus).
70. State ex rel. Grecco v. Allen Circuit Court, 238 Ind. 571, 575, 153 N.E.2d 914, 916
(1958).
71. Cases cited note 69 supra.
72. See Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958), for an explanation of when
the right to appellate counsel will be considered as a matter of due process, and when it will
be considered as a right guaranteed under the sixth amendment.
73. 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
74. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937).
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cannot provide himself, and is not provided with counsel, learned and
skilled in the law; and therefore withholding counsel as a practical matter
withholds the right to review, and to corrective judicial process, and
hence to due process of law.75
Thus far, such eloquence has been rather futile.
Importance of Counsel on Appeal
To arrive at a sound conclusion regarding the importance of coun-
sel on appeal, it is necessary to consider the function of criminal ap-
peals. Certainly the primary function of an appeal is to protect the
appellant from an unjust conviction.7' The value of this function is
no longer a matter for conjecture. Statistics indicate that a large
percentage of cases heard on appeal are not affirmed.77  From 1949
to 1954, in the state of Illinois, the percentage of reversals in crimi-
nal cases appealed to the supreme court of that state ranged from 25
per cent to 37.9 per cent. 8 In the years of 1952 and 1953, 40 per
cent of the criminal appeals in Wisconsin resulted in reversals. Dur-
ing the same period of time, in the appellate courts of Kansas, 12
per cent of the criminal cases heard were reversed. 9 In federal
courts, the percentage of reversals in criminal cases was 13.8 in 1952,
and 26.1 in 1955.80 These figures strongly support the conclusion
that the accused who has the opportunity of full appellate review has
a substantially greater chance of retaining life and liberty than one
to whom that opportunity is denied.
What chance of success has the appellant who is not represented
by counsel? Few would dispute the fact that the appellant, without
counsel to aid him, is not capable of recognizing the impropriety of
the admission or exclusion of evidence, the inadequacy of the court's
charge to the jury, prejudicial conduct by the judge or the prosecuting
attorney, or the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.
It has been suggested that the members of the appellate court may ex-
amine the record and reach a just result without the aid of counsel.81
However, this suggestion ignores the adversary nature of the Ameri-
can system of law. The adversary system proceeds on the theory that
... each litigant is most interested and will be most effective in seek-
ing, discovering, and presenting the materials which will reveal the
strength of his own case and the weakness of his adversary's case so that
the truth will emerge to the impartial tribunal that makes the decision.82
75. State exrel. White v. Hilgemann, 218 Ind. 572, 576, 34 N.E.2d 129, 135 (1941).
76. ORFiELD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 32.
77. Id. at 212-14.
78. Brief for Petitioner, pp. 21-25, Griffin v. Ilnois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Richardson v. United States, 267 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Ballentine,
245 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1957).
82. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF Irr-
IGATION 3 (1956).
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When only one party is capable of presenting its case, the adversary
system fails. Although an appellate court may give every considera-
tion to the pathetic efforts of an indigent who appeals without coun-
sel, it cannot be said that the aid of an experienced advocate would
have no effect upon the outcome of a case.83 Furthermore, if an in-
digent is not given legal advice, his appeal may be barred altogether
by failure to file the proper papers within the time specified by law.
All of these factors demonstrate the importance of appellate counsel
to the adequate achievement of the primary purpose of criminal ap-
peals - protection against wrongful convictions.
A second and vital function of criminal appeals "is to determine
and maintain consistent standards in the trial courts."' 4  This func-
tion may be of little importance to the individual appellant, but it is
extremely important to the American judicial system and to society
in general.
The taking of an appeal and perhaps even more the possibility thereof
prevents or does much to check lack of uniformity in the administration
of the criminal law. It assures that the same rules of substantive law
will be applied in all the courts of the state. It furthermore assures that
the more basic and essential rules of procedure will be followed in the
lower courts.85
Establishment of this uniformity also contributes to the accomplish-
ment of securing justice for the accused.
It would be difficult to establish a precise correlation between the
quality of representation in given cases, and the quality of decisions
rendered. However, it is reasonable to assume that the presence of
an attorney who can explain the particular facts of a case, relate those
facts to the legal questions in issue, and provide the court with the
precedent upon which it should rely, will have a real bearing upon the
nature of the decision rendered. Thus, apart from the importance of
counsel to the appellant, courts themselves will benefit from the pres-
ence of counsel, while the legal system will benefit by achieving
greater consistency.
CONCLUSION
There is something wrong with a system of government which ra-
tions justice in accordance with the thickness of a man's wallet. It
is true that there are some "contingencies of life which are hardly
within the power, let alone the duty, of a State to correct or cush-
ion";"6 but can it be said that the state owes its citizens no duty to
83. "[A]ppellate advocacy is an art.... It is a process wherein one human mind attempts
to propel three other human minds into a certain channel to a certain result." Prettyman,
Some Observations Concerning Appellate Advocacy, 39 VA. L. REV. 285 (1953).
84. ORFIELD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 33.
85. Ibid.
86. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 25 (1956).
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